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Abstract
Everywhere in our daily life many computer systems, such as telecommunication
systems and networked home appliances, are in use. Many new services for these
systems are developed to meet various requirements of customers. However, the
new services may have conflict with existing services. These conflicts are called
feature interaction. Feature interaction can occur when several services are exe-
cuted at the same time.
In many cases feature interactions cause undesirable behaviors of a system.
Hence, to develop new services, it is very important to prevent occurrence of fea-
ture interactions. However, detecting feature interactions of concurrent systems is
very difficult because such systems have many execution patterns. In addition, the
concurrency causes the low repeatability of feature interaction.
Model checking has attracted recent attention as one of the powerful verifi-
cation techniques to deal with such complex systems. Model checking allows an
automatic and exhaustive verification of software and system designs modeled as
state machines. The correctness criteria are specified in a temporal logic. When
the design fails to meet the correctness criteria, model checking tools can usually
produce a counterexample. Using this counterexample, one can easily detect the
cause of the error.
i
ii
This dissertation focuses on model checking and proposes methods for detect-
ing feature interactions of services in two types of systems: telecommunication
systems and home network systems.
First, this dissertation proposes a new unbounded model checking method for
feature interaction verification for telecommunication systems. To deal with the
concurrency of telecommunication systems, we propose to use a new scheme for
encoding the behavior of the system and adapt the unbounded model checking
algorithm to this encoding. To demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, we
conduct experiments where 21 pairs of telecommunication services are verified
using several methods including ours. The results show that our approach ex-
hibits significant speed-up over unbounded model checking using the traditional
encoding.
Second, a framework for detecting feature interactions in home network sys-
tems is proposed. Our proposed method consists of two steps. In the first step, a
model is developed to capture the behavior of the services. In the second step, the
model is automatically analyzed to see if possible interactions exist. This auto-
matic analysis can be effectively performed with model checking techniques. The
usefulness of the proposed approach is demonstrated through a case study.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Everywhere in our daily life many computer systems, such as telecommunication
systems and networked home appliances, are in use. Many new services for these
systems are developed to meet various requirements of customers. However, the
new services may have conflict with existing services. These conflicts are called
feature interaction [10]. Feature interaction can occur when several services are
executed at the same time.
In many cases feature interactions cause undesirable behaviors of a system.
Hence, to develop new services, it is very important to prevent occurrent of fea-
ture interactions. In practical development, however, ad hoc testing is usually
conducted to prevent feature interactions. This leads to services which have no
interaction-free guarantee.
Many approaches have been proposed to deal with feature interactions. The
term “feature interaction problem” in telecommunication systems was proposed
1
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by E.J. Cameron and N. Griffeth of Bellcore in the early 1980s. The first effort to
provide a framework for the field of feature interaction had been made by Bowen
et. al. [6] in 1989. Since then, much research focusing on feature interactions has
been studied by researchers from academia, research centers and industries [2,
5, 8, 12, 15, 16, 26, 45]. Keck and Kuehn surveyed approaches for overcoming
feature interactions [24].
Today, feature interaction is not unique to the field of the telecommunication
systems. Feature interactions have become problematic in other fields, such as,
Web services [48] and building control systems [37]. In the field of home network
systems, several studies have been conducted [27, 39].
This dissertation focuses on feature interaction in telecommunication systems
and in home network systems. Detection of feature interactions of these concur-
rent systems is very difficult because such systems have many execution patterns.
In addition, the concurrency causes the low repeatability of feature interaction.
Model checking [13] has attracted recent attention as one of the powerful ver-
ification techniques to deal with such complexity. Model checking allows an au-
tomatic and exhaustive verification of software and system designs modeled as
state machines. The correctness criteria are specified in a temporal logic. When
the design fails to meet the correctness criteria, model checking tools can usually
produce a counterexample. Using this counterexample, one can easily detect the
cause of the error.
This dissertation proposes model checking-based methods for detecting fea-
ture interactions of services in two types of systems: telecommunication systems
and home network systems by using model checking.
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1.2 Main Results
1.2.1 Feature Interaction Verification in Telecommunication Sys-
tems
As for the first contribution, this dissertation proposes a new unbounded model
checking method for feature interaction verification for telecommunication sys-
tems. The application of unbounded model checking to asynchronous systems,
such as telecommunication systems, has rarely been practiced. This is because,
with the conventional encoding the behavior of an asynchronous system can only
be represented as a large propositional formula, thus resulting in large compu-
tational cost. To overcome this problem we propose to use a new scheme for
encoding the behavior of the system and adapt the unbounded model checking
algorithm to this encoding. By exploiting the concurrency of an asynchronous
system, this encoding scheme allows a very concise formula to represent system’s
behavior.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, we conduct experiments
where 21 pairs of telecommunication services are verified using several methods
including ours. The results show that our approach exhibits significant speed-up
over unbounded model checking using the traditional encoding.
1.2.2 Feature Interaction Verification in Home Network Sys-
tems
As for the second contribution, this dissertation proposes a framework for detect-
ing feature interactions in home network systems. Our proposed method consists
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of two steps. In the first step, a model is developed to capture the behavior of the
services and the feature interactions in home network systems are classified based
on their causes. In the second step, the model is automatically analyzed to see if
possible interactions exist. This automatic analysis can be effectively performed
with model checking techniques.
At the first step, we propose a model which consists of four parts: users,
services, appliances and environment and classified feature interactions into five
types based on their causes. At the second step, we propose a method for trans-
lating from our proposed model into Promela, which is the input language of the
model checker SPIN. A property that represents the occurrence of each type of
feature interactions is also proposed. By using Promela code and properties ob-
tained by our approach, one can detect feature interactions automatically.
The usefulness of the proposed approach is demonstrated through a case study.
The result shows that the proposed method can successfully detect any of five
types of feature interactions.
1.3 Overview of Dissertation
This dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 describes feature interaction
and model checking method. Chapter 3 describes the first contribution, enti-
tled “Feature Interaction Verification with Interpolant-based Unbounded Model
Checking.” In this chapter, some examples of practical telecommunication ser-
vices and feature interactions between those services are described. Next, our pro-
posed encoding is shown and a method for detecting those interactions by using
the proposed encoding is also presented. In Chapter 4, entitled “Feature Interac-
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tions Verification in Home network system,” the second contribution is described.
First, this chapter shows examples of home network services and interactions in
home network systems. Next, our proposed model and classification of feature
interactions are presented. Finally, our proposed method for detecting feature in-
teractions in home network systems are described. Chapter 5 summarizes this
dissertation and discusses future work.
Chapter 2
Preliminary
2.1 Feature Interaction
Feature interaction refers to situations where the behavior of different services
affect each other. Feature interactions may cause the undesirable behavior of ser-
vicesm and thus are considered a very serious problem in developing new services.
2.1.1 Feature Interaction in Telecommunication Systems
In telecommunication systems, many services are provided by modifying basic
telecommunication services. For example, the Call Forwarding (CF) service al-
lows the user to forward incoming calls to another address, and the Originating
Call Screening (OCS) service restricts outgoing calls according to a screening list.
When the new services have conflict with existing services or other new services,
feature interactions occur.
We show an example of feature interaction in telecommunication systems.
Consider a situation where user  has subscribed to the OCS service and specified
6
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user  in the screening list. User  has activated the CF service to user . In this
situation, if  calls , the call is forwarded to  by the CF service. As a result,
the feature of the OCS service is ignored.
2.1.2 Feature Interaction in Home Network Systems
As home appliances are becoming increasingly interconnected, the use of home
network systems is being expanded [38, 47, 41, 17]. Home network systems in-
tegrate different features of appliances to provide value-added services. For ex-
ample, by integrating an air-conditioner, a ventilator and thermometers, one can
implement an energy-saving HVAC (heating, ventilation and air-conditioning)
service. Another example could be an air-cleaning service which automatically
cleans the room air by controlling a ventilator and a smoke sensor.
Here, an example of feature interactions in home network systems is shown.
Assume that the HVAC service is operating the air-conditioner to warm up the
room temperature and that at the same time the air-cleaning service is using the
ventilator to clean the room air. If the room temperature is higher than the outside
temperature, then cool outside air is taken into the room by the ventilator, which
results in the low efficiency of the HVAC service.
In home network systems, the “physical” environment is an important factor to
deal with feature interactions. The change of the environment is not explicit as the
change of the state of the appliances. For example, the temperature of room does
not immediately reach the value of the temperature setting of an air-conditioner
just after the air-conditioner is turned on. In dealing with the feature interaction
problem for home network systems, such a property of the environment must be
taken into consideration.
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2.2 Model Checking
Model checking is a technique for verifying state transition systems. Model
checking explores the state space to determine whether or not a given property
holds in the system. This method allows an automatic and exhaustive verification
of software and system designs. The correctness criteria are specified in a tempo-
ral logic. When the design fails to meet the correctness criteria, model checking
tools can usually produce a counterexample. Using this counterexample, one can
easily detect the cause of the error.
For realistic systems, however, the number of states of the system model can
be very large, making the model checking problem intractable. This problem
is called the state explosion problem. This problem is one of the most serious
problems with model checking. To deal with this problem, many methods have
been proposed.
2.2.1 Unbounded Model Checking
One of the approaches to the state explosion problem is bounded model check-
ing [4, 14]. The main idea of bounded model checking is to look for counterex-
amples that are shorter than some fixed length  for a given property. This limita-
tion allows one to reduce the model checking problem to the satisfiability (SAT)
checking problem for a formula of some logic such that its satisfiability implies
the existence of a counterexample. Thus if the formula turns out to be satisfi-
able, then it is possible to conclude that the violation of the property occurs in the
system.
Although effective in detecting property violation, bounded model checking
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cannot be directly used for proving the absence of violation. To cope with this dis-
advantage, McMillan proposed unbounded model checking [36], which combines
bounded model checking and interpolation. In the field of hardware verification,
unbounded model checking has been successful in verifying the properties of the
circuits that cannot be verified by other model checking methods [23].
The key observation used in McMillan’s method is that when bounded model
checking fails to find a counterexample, in which case the formula is unsatisfi-
able, an over-approximation of the state set reachable in one step can be derived
from the unsatisfiability proof produced by the SAT solver. Technically this over-
approximation is obtained in the form of an interpolant of the tested formula,
using an interpolation procedure. By repeatedly executing the interpolant proce-
dure, an over-approximation of the reachable state set can be obtained. If this
over-approximation contains no state violating a given property, then it is ensured
that the system meets that property.
2.2.2 SPIN
The SPIN model checker [21] is a verification tool for concurrent systems. In this
tool the partial order reduction [42] is used to reduce the state space to be checked.
To use SPIN, the behavior of a system needs to be described in the Promela lan-
guage, the input language of SPIN. Properties to be verified are represented as
Linear-Time Temporal Logic (LTL) [43].
In a Promela program, a system is defined as a collection of processes which
run asynchronously. These processes communicate via buffered channels and
shared global variables. Each process consists of a sequence of local variable
declarations, message channel declarations and statements.
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An LTL formula represents properties about the execution traces of the Promela
program, where a trace is sequence of states. The model checker determines
whether or not all traces starting with the initial state satisfies a given LTL for-
mula. LTL formulas are translated into processes called never-claims in Promela.
The never-claim processes are equivalent to Bu¨chi Automata [7]. Such processes
represents undesirable behavior of the system.
Chapter 3
Feature Interaction Verification in
Telecommunication Systems
3.1 Introduction
This chapter proposes a method for verifying feature interactions in telecommu-
nication systems [34]. This method uses unbounded model checking with inter-
polant.
The application of unbounded model checking to asynchronous systems has
rarely been practiced. Indeed we are not aware of any application to telecommu-
nication systems. This can be explained by the fact that with the conventional
encoding, the behavior of an asynchronous system can only be represented as a
large formula, thus resulting in large computational cost.
In our proposed method, we use a new scheme for encoding the behavior
of the system. By exploiting the concurrency of the telecommunication system,
this encoding scheme allows a very concise representation of system’s behavior.
11
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By adapting unbounded model checking to this encoding, we obtain our model
checking method. The effectiveness of our approach is demonstrated through
experiments.
Previous attempts to improve the performance of unbounded model checking
include, for example, [30, 1, 46]. In [30], the method of reusing interpolants is
proposed to efficiently obtain an over-approximation of the reachable state set. In
[1], hybridization of interpolation and abstraction refinement is studied. In [46],
a new interpolation algorithm which is based on linear programming is proposed.
These studies aim to improve the interpolation procedure but do not focus on
the representation of the behavior of the system. The central idea behind our
encoding can also be seen in [49, 40]. In [40] a similar encoding is proposed in
the context of the verification of safe Petri nets. The encoding proposed in [49] is
used to represent telecommunication systems, as is done in this chapter. However
transition ordering, which will be explained in Section 3.3.2 is not applied in the
encoding of [49]. More importantly, in contrast to this chapter where unbounded
model checking is discussed, these early attempts only deal with bounded model
checking.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: In Section 3.2, examples of
services and feature interaction in telecommunication systems are shown. Section
3.3 shows a new scheme for encoding the behavior of the system. Next, a method
for adapting unbounded model checking to this encoding is described. In Sec-
tion 3.4, the effectiveness of our approach is demonstrated through experiments.
Finally, Section 3.5 summarizes this chapter.
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3.2 Telecommunication Services
3.2.1 Examples of Services
In this chapter we consider seven telecommunication services taken from ITU-U
recommendation [22] and Bellcore’s feature standard [3].
Call Waiting (CW): This service allows the subscriber to receive a second in-
coming call while he or she is already talking.
Call Forwarding (CF): This service allows the subscriber to have his or her in-
coming calls forwarded to another address.
Originating Call Screening (OCS): This service allows the subscriber to spec-
ify that outgoing calls be either restricted or allowed according to a screen-
ing list.
Terminating Call Screening (TCS): This service allows the subscriber to spec-
ify that incoming calls be either restricted or allowed according to a screen-
ing list.
Denied Origination (DO): This service allows the subscriber to disable any call
originating from the terminal. Only terminating calls are permitted.
Denied Termination (DT): This service allows the subscriber to disable any call
terminating at the terminal. Only originating calls are permitted.
Directed Connect (DC): This service is a so-called hot line service. Suppose
that  subscribes to DC and that  specifies  as the destination address.
Then, by only off-hooking,  is directly calling . It is not necessary for 
to dial .
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3.2.2 Feature Interaction
Two types of feature interaction are considered. The freedom from these types
of interaction can be viewed as safety properties. In order to detect these types
of interactions, it suffices to check the reachability the initial state to undesirable
states where feature interaction occurs.
Invariant Violation
It is usually the case that services require some specific properties to be satisfied
at any time. For example, the OCS service requires that if  specifies  in the
screening list, then  is never calling  at any time. Such a property is generally
referred to as an invariant. However, combining multiple services can result in
violation of this property. Consider a situation where user  has subscribed to
OCS service and specified user  in the screening list while user  has activated
CF service to . In this situation, if  calls , the call is forwarded to  by the
CF service. As a result, the invariant property of OCS is violated.
Nondeterminism
Nondeterminism is one of the best known types of feature interactions [18, 25].
Nondeterminism refers to a situation where a single event can simultaneously
activate two or more functionalities of different services, and as a result, it cannot
be determined exactly which functionality should be activated. For example, this
type of interaction can occur between the CW service and the CF service. Suppose
that user  subscribes both services. Now consider the situation where  is talking
with user  while user  is in ’s forwarding address list. If user  dials , then
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either the call from  to  may be received by  because of CW, or the call may
be forwarded to  because of CF.
3.2.3 System Model
We use State Transition Rules (STR) [20] to describe services and to model the
behavior of the system. A service is defined as a 6-tuple  	 
   
  
,
where 	 is a finite set of service users, 
 is a finite set of variables,  is a set of
predicates,  is a finite set of events,  is a finite set of rules, and 
  
is the initial
state. A predicate    is of the form  
 
 

     where 
 
 
 . An event
   is of the form  
 
 

     where 
 
 
 . A rule    is of the form:
    
The pre-condition is a set of predicates or negations of predicates, or both, while
the post-condition is a set of predicates.
Figure 3.1 shows an example of a service specification expressed in STR. This
specification describes the Plain Old Telephone Service (POTS). Additional com-
munication features can be described by modifying this specification (for exam-
ple, by adding new rules).
A predicate (or an event or a rule) is instantiated by substituting a user   	
for each variable   
 occurring in the predicate (event or rule, respectively)
such that no two variables are substituted by the same user. That is, given a pred-
icate  
 
 

        and a substitution    
 

 
 



    ,      

 
 

, we have a predicate instance  
 
 

    . An event instance or a rule
instance is defined similarly. We let   
 
     

 denote the set of all predi-
cate instances and  denote the number of the predicate instances (i.e.   .
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	
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Figure 3.1: Rule-based specification for POTS
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Also we denote by 
  
 
 

     

 the set of all rule instances and by  the
number of the rule instances (i.e.   
).
A state is defined as a set of predicate instances and is regarded as representing
the predicate instances that hold in that state. We denote by  the set of states,
that is,     .
The execution semantics is as follows. For a rule instance   
, let 
denote the set of predicate instances in the pre-condition of  and  denote
the set of predicate instances whose negations are in the pre-condition. Also let

  denote the set of the predicate instances in the post-condition of  and 
denote the event instance of .  is enabled for  in a state  iff all instances in
 hold and no instance in  hold in ; that is,    and  
. Exactly one enabled rule instance is selected for execution at a time. The
execution of an enabled rule  causes a state transition from  to the next state ,
by deleting all instances in  from  and adding all instances in 
 ; that
is        
 .
Example 1 Consider the specification of POTS in Figure 3.1. Let  be the rule
instance of   
 based on    . Then     ,  
, and 
     . In state          is enabled
for event   — the event that subscriber  picks up the phone. If  is
executed in , then a transition to state         occurs.
In general a state transition system is represented as      where  is the
set of states,      is the transition relation, and    is the set of initial
states. Now, for each rule instance , let 

    be the relation over states
such that     

iff  is enabled in  for some event instance and its execution
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causes a state transition to . The state transition system      defined by
an STR specification    	 
   
  
 is such that  
 



and
  
  
. We denote by    iff     

.
3.3 Proposed Method
3.3.1 Symbolic Representation
We propose a propositional SAT-based unbounded model checking method. In
order to use propositional SAT solvers for model checking, it is essential to encode
the state space and the transition relation with Boolean variables.
Recall that   
 
     

 is the set of predicate instances. A state can be
represented as a Boolean -vector such that it has a 	 in the th position iff

 
holds in that state. In the following of the chapter, we represent states with 
Boolean variables    !
 
     !

; that is, a state is a truth assignment of these
 variables.
Any set 

  of states can be represented as a Boolean function " 
	 


 	 
 such that:
"  





	   


  

For example, the state set where the pre-condition of a rule instance  holds is
represented as:


  


 

!
 



 



	!
 
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The relation over states is also represented as a Boolean function with  Boolean
variables, since the relation is simply a set of state pairs. We therefore identify a
set of states or of transitions with its corresponding Boolean function. For exam-
ple, 

is represented as:


  

  

 



 
 
!

 



 

	!

 



 
   
 !
 
 !

 

where    !
 
     !

 and    !
 
    !


. The operator  means that two
operands have same value.
Example 2 For simplicity, we use the name of a predicate instance to denote
its corresponding Boolean variable. Let  be the instance of the rule  in
Figure 3.1 with substitution    . Then we have 

  

     
  

	  

       

       


  	
  	
 

  	
   	
 

   -
     

       

    
 

       

.
The transition relation  is represented as:
   

 




  


For simplicity, assume that we know that  is a total relation [13]. Then whether
state set # is reachable from the initial state in  steps can be determined by
checking the satisfiability of the following formula:
  

    

 
 
        
 
 

 

# 

     # 



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This is the basic formula used in SAT-based model checking.
3.3.2 Boolean Encoding of Telecommunication Systems
The obstacle to applying SAT-based model checking to asynchronous systems
like telecommunication systems is that the transition relation  for such a system
can only be represented as a large formula. This can be understood by seeing
Example 2: To represent the transitions for each rule instance , 

must contain
conjuncts  !
 
 !

 
 for all Boolean variables !
 
that represent predicate instances
not engaged in that rule. Our encoding overcomes this disadvantage.
The intuitive idea is as follows: We introduce a new semantics for system
execution that maintains safety properties of the original model. In this semantics
the  rule instances are totally ordered and a step is represented as a sequence of
 “micro” steps. The th micro step is either the state transition by the th rule
instance or a stuttering step. Because only two state transitions are possible at
each micro step, this semantics can avoid a blow-up in the formula size, which is
inherent to symbolic representation of asynchronous systems.
Let   denote the set of predicate instances that change their truth value
as a result of the execution of rule instance ; that is,    
 
   
 . Our encoding can avoid generating a large subformula related
to  .
Now let 

  

 be defined as follows:
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

  

  

  

 


 
 
 !
 
 !

 


	



 

!
 



 



	!
 



 
  
!

 



 
 
	!

 




 
	
 
 !
 
 !

 






 
 	

 !
 
 !

 

Example 3 Let  be the rule instance of 
 in Figure 3.1 with substitution
   . Then          and thus we have 

  

 
	

    

	  




       

   
  




        

         

 
 	
   	
 

   	
   	
 

    -
     

       

    
 

       

.
By definition 

  

  	 iff    or   . Using this property, a step
(or more) can be represented by a conjunction of 

  

 as follows:
 

     

 

  


 
 
  
 
 

 

     

 evaluates to true iff any     , 
  

 
 
 
or 
  
 
 
.
This means that if this function evaluates to true, 

is reachable from 

in at
most  steps (including 0 steps), and that if there is at least one 
 
such that    ,
 

     

 evaluates to true under an assignment such that   

    

  
, 
  

 
 
 
, and 
 
     

 

.
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Consequently, the following formula !"  can be used for the verification.
!" 

   

 


 

     
 
  # 


If !"  is satisfiable, then some state in # is reachable from the initial state
in at most   steps. If !"  is unsatisfiable, then no state in # can be reached
from the initial state in  steps.
A major benefit of using this formula is that it can be shortened to a consider-
able extent and thus in turn the run time of SAT solving can be reduced. The idea
is as follows. Note that in !" , term  !
 
 !

 
 for any 
 
    occurs
as a conjunct (See the definition of 

  

. Replacing !
 
with !
 
, such a term can
safely be removed from !"  without altering the satisfiability, because !" 
is satisfiable only if !
 
and !
 
have the same truth value.
The effect of this optimization is significant, since for practical telecommu-
nication services, a rule execution affects only a small fraction of the predicate
instances. Compared to the conventional formula shown in Section 3.3.1, a reduc-
tion of around 60 to 90 percent in the number of literal occurrences has typically
been observed in the examples tested in Section 3.4.
Remark 1 For presentation purpose we explain our model checking method us-
ing the original !" ; but this optimization is always used in the implementa-
tion.
Transition Ordering
In practice, the state transitions represented by  critically depend on the order
of rule instances. This can be intuitively explained as follows: Consider two rule
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instances 
 
and 

and suppose that the execution of 
 
cause the precondition of


to hold but not vice versa. In this case, if 
 
occurs before 

in , then  can
represent the successive execution of 
 
and 

. On the other hand, if 
 
comes after


, then  can only express the execution of only one of the two rule instances.
We propose a heuristic algorithm for transition ordering, by extending the one
in [40], which is proposed in the context of safe Petri nets. The basic idea is to
select a rule instance  when each predicate instance in  occurs in 
  
or
in the post-condition of an already selected rule instance. Figure 3.2 shows the
algorithm.
The FIFO queue# is used for storing rule instances that have already been
ordered. The set   of predicate instances is used to maintain those occur-
ring in the initial state or in the post-condition of rule instances ordered already.
The main part of the algorithm calls procedure CHECK with each predicate in-
stance occurring in the initial state. In the procedure, first  is added to   .
Then, for each rule instance  such that   , the following is done: If 
has not yet been ordered and all predicate instances in  have been stored
in   , then  is enqueued and the procedure is recursively called with each
predicate instance in 
 . Since a rule instance  is ordered only after all pred-
icate instances in  are stored in   , for any predicate instance  in
, it occurs in the initial state or there must be at least one already ordered
rule instance  such that   
 .
In case a given service specification is ill-formed, this algorithm may fail to
order all rule instances. It is easy to show that in such a case, the rule instances not
selected for ordering are always unenabled, and thus they can safely be omitted.
Example 4 Consider the service specification in Figure 3.1 and let     
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1: set     ; Keeps predicate instances.
2: queue #   ; Keeps ordered rule instances.
3: for all   
  
do
4: call CHECK ;
5: end for
6:
7: Procedure: CHECK 
8: add  to   ;
9: for all  such that    do
10: if  $ # and        then
11: enqueue  to #;
12: for all  such that   
  and  $   do
13: call CHECK ;
14: end for
15: end if
16: end for
17: end Procedure
Figure 3.2: Algorithm for ordering transitions
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and     . The algorithm orders a total of 18 rule instances as follows:
 
 
     
 
 = (
, 
 , 
, 
 , 
, 
 , 
,

, 
 , 
, 
, 
, 
 , 
 , 
, 
,

, 
), where  denotes the instance of a rule  with a substitution .
With this ordering,    allows reachability checking for 12 states, including
state     which requires 
 
 
, 
	
 
, and

  
 
  to occur in this order to be reached. On the other hand, if the rule in-
stances were reversely ordered, the efficiency would be much deteriorated. In this
case !"   can check the reachability of only four states:      ,
      ,      , and      .
3.3.3 Unbounded Model Checking
State Exploration Using Interpolants
For two first-order logic formulas  and , if    is unsatisfiable, then the
interpolant  for  and  is a formula with the following properties:
    ,
   is unsatisfiable, and
  refers only to the common variables of  and .
Several interpolation methods have been proposed, including [36, 44, 46]. Us-
ing an interpolation method with a SAT solver, one can simultaneously perform
satisfiability checking and, if the formula is unsatisfiable, interpolant generation.
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We divide !"  into $%& and '(&&  as follows:
$%&    

  

     


'(&&



  
 
 
     
  
 # 


If $%&  '(&&  is satisfiable, then the system can reach a state in #. On the
other hand, if $%&  '(&&  is unsatisfiable, then an interpolant of $%& and
'(&&
 can be generated.
The interpolant refers only to the common variables of $%& and '(&& .
Hence, it is a formula over state 

. We denote by ) 

 this inter-
polant and by ) 

 

 the formula obtained from ) 


by replacing Boolean variables for 

with those for .
Since the interpolant is implied by $%& , it follows that the ) 


 

 is true in the initial state and in every state reachable from the initial state in
one step. In other words, ) 

 

 is an over-approximation of the
state set reachable from the initial state within one step.
In effect this interpolant usually contains more reachable states than those
reachable in one step, because  can represent, in addition to all single steps,
up to  consecutive steps. This property contributes to effective state exploration
of our method.
Overview of the Algorithm
The overview of the algorithm is shown in Figure 3.3. The input of the al-
gorithm is a service specification    	 
   
  
 and the state set #
whose reachability is to be verified.
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1: Construct      # from  and #;
2: while true do
3:   ;
4: FINITERUN   ;
5: if  then
6:    	 ;
7: else if true is returned then
8: return Reachable;
9: else if false then
10: return Unreachable;
11: end if
12: end while
Figure 3.3: Unbounded model checking for given (SS,G)
First, we build the symbolic representations of the transition system   
  # from the given service specification    	 
   
  
.
The function FINITERUN is at the heart of the algorithm. It has two arguments
  and . The function returns true if it determines, by performing SAT solving
for !" , that a state in # is reachable and returns false if it determines that
no state in # is reachable. In these cases, the algorithm can terminate simply
by returning Reachable or Unreachable, according to the result of FINTERUN.
FINTERUN aborts if it is impossible to determine whether or not # is reachable
by using given . In this case, the algorithm increases  and calls FINITERUN
again.
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The function FINITERUN
The function FINITERUN is shown in Figure 3.4. The basic design of this
function follows that of [36] but is adapted to subtle but important differences in
the encoding of system behaviors, elaborated in Section 3.3.2.
This function first checks the satisfiability of $%&  '(&& . If $%& 
'(&&
 is satisfiable, then at least one of the states in # is reachable from the
initial state (line 9). Hence, this function returns true. On the other hand, if
$%&'(&&
 is unsatisfiable, then state exploration is performed by repeatedly
computing interpolants.
In the function  is used to represent the set of explored states. Initially 
only represents the initial state. In each iteration of the while loop,  is updated
to the interpolant for $%& and '(&&  (line 19) and $%& is updated with  
being replaced with  (line 5). At the end of the th execution of the while loop,
 represents an over-approximation of a set of states that are reachable within 
steps.
As discussed in Section 3.3.3 in detail, the iteration of the while loop eventu-
ally terminates (or aborts) in either of two ways. The first case is where $%& 
'(&&
 turns out to be satisfiable. Then the function aborts (line 11), since the
satisfiability of $%&  '(&&  only means the reachability of # from  which
may contain unreachable states.
The second case is where  reaches a fixed point — the point from which 
will never grow further. At this point  contains all reachable states and thus the
unreachability of # is immediately concluded from the unsatisfiability of$%&
'(&&

. If this happens, the function terminates by returning false (line 17).
3.3. PROPOSED METHOD 29
1: Function: FINITERUN(     #  % )
2:    ;
3: while true do
4:      #;
5: Generate $%&  '(&&  from   
6: Run SAT on $%&  '(&& ;
7: if satisfiable then
8: if    then
9: return true; Can be reached only in the 1st iteration.
10: else
11: abort;
12: end if
13: else
14: Generate interpolant() 

) of $%&  '(&& ;
15:   ) 

 

$

;
16: if    then
17: return false;
18: else
19:   ;
20: end if
21: end if
22: end while
23: end Function
Figure 3.4: Function FINITERUN for given    
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Correctness of the Algorithm
Lemma 1 FINITERUN    terminates for every    .
Proof: First, suppose that # is reachable from the initial state. If !"  is sat-
isfiable, then the function terminates by returning true. If !"  is unsatisfiable,
then the function proceeds to the iterative generation of interpolants. In this it-
erative process,  gradually increases until it reaches a fixed point. Such a fixed
point must exist since the state space is finite and contains all reachable states.
Thus  always grows to the extent where !"  is satisfiable, in which case the
function aborts (at line 11) since    .
Next, suppose # is unreachable from the initial state. Since !"  is un-
satisfiable at the first time (at line 6), the function tries to compute the over-
approximate set of states reachable from the initial state. During this computation,
if !"  becomes satisfiable, then the function aborts since    . Otherwise,
the process of computing the over-approximation of the reachable state set termi-
nates because the state space is finite. In this case,    holds at line 16 and
thus false is returned (at line 17).
Lemma 2 For every   , there exists  such that FINITERUN    terminates
without aborting.
Proof: If # is reachable, then the result of the first run of SAT must be “satisfi-
able” when     , in which case the function returns true and terminates.
Now suppose that # is unreachable and let 

be the maximum length (the
number of transitions) of the shortest path from any state in  to any state in
#. Of course such a path only contains unreachable states. Let  be 

	 .
Then $%&  '(&&  is always unsatisfiable in any run of SAT. This can be ex-
plained by showing that  never contains unreachable states. In the first iteration,
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this trivially holds since    . In any later iteration,  is an interpolant for
$%& and '(&& , and thus  

  '(&&
 is unsatisfiable. This implies that
 contains no unreachable state, because if an unreachable state existed in , then
 

  '(&&
 would be satisfiable since # can be reached within 

   
steps from that state. Since the number of states of the system is finite,  eventu-
ally reaches a fixed point, at which time the function returns false and terminates.
Lemma 3 When FINITERUN    terminates, it returns true if # is reachable
and false if # is unreachable.
Proof: First suppose the function returns true. This means that !"  (at line
6) is satisfiable; hence # is reachable from initial state. Next suppose that the
function returns false. In this case,  represents an over-approximation of the set
of reachable states and $%&  '(&&  is unsatisfiable with that . Since any
reachable state is contained in , the fact that $%&  '(&&  is unsatisfiable
implies that no state in # is reachable.
Theorem 1 The algorithm shown in Figure 3.3 terminates. It returns Reachable
if # is reachable from the initial state; it returns Unreachable, otherwise.
Proof: The proof straightforwardly follows from Lemmas 1, 2 and 3.
3.4 Experiment Results
To evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed method, we conducted experiments.
We verified 21 pairs of telecommunication services described in Section 3.2.1
using the proposed unbounded model checking method, McMillan’s unbounded
model checking method [36] and the model checker SPIN [21]. We implemented
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these two unbounded model checking methods using McMillan’s FOCI tool for
both SAT solving and interpolant generation. In the proposed unbounded model
checking method, the new encoding and the proposed algorithm are used. On
the other hand, McMillan’s method uses conventional encoding with  and the
interpolant procedure proposed in [36].
SPIN, a very well-known model checker, uses explicit state representation, in
the sense that it does not employ Boolean state space encoding. We construct
Promela models for telecommunication services as follows. We represent each
predicate instance by a Boolean variable. We use a single Promela process to
represent the behavior of the whole system. The Promela process has, in turn, a
single big do statement, in which every rule instance is represented as a guarded
command. At any point of time, a single guarded command whose guard is true
is nondeterministically selected for execution.
The experiments were performed on a Linux (kernel 2.4) PC with a 2.8 GHz
CPU and about 3 Gbyte memory.
We consider invariant properties for four of the seven services as follows:
OCS: If x puts y in the OCS screening list, x is never calling y at any time.
(	* '    	   )
TCS: If x puts y in the TCS screening list, y is never calling x at any time.
(	+ '     	   )
DO: If x subscribes DO, x never receives dialtone at any time. (	#*  
	  )
DT: If x subscribes DT, y is never calling x at any time. (	#+  	   )
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Consequently a total of 18 pairs that contain at least one of the four services are
verified against these invariant properties. Because of the symmetry of users, we
check the violation with a single variable substitution by users. For example, the
invariant of OCS is verified by checking reachability to #   	 	* '  
	  , where* '  and    are Boolean variables rep-
resenting predicate instances * '   and   .
Nondeterminism occurs in states where two rules simultaneously become en-
abled for the same event. Due to user symmetry, it suffices to check all event
instances obtained from any single variable substitution 

of users. Thus we let:
#  

	

 
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




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Here 

is an event instance obtained by the substitution 

and 
 
and 

are
two different rule instances that have the same event instance 

. For example,
consider the specification shown in Figure 3.1 and let 

   . Three
event instances, namely,  ,   and   , are shared by
more than one rule instance. Specifically,   triggers 


, 


,



and 


,   triggers 


and 


, and   
triggers 
 

and 
 

. Hence we have #  
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.
Table 3.1 shows the results of the verification of the violation of invariant
properties, while Table 3.2 shows the results of the verification of nondetermin-
ism. The two leftmost columns represent the combination of services tested and
whether feature interaction occurs in that combination.
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Table 3.1: Verification result of violation of invariant
Proposed method McMillan’s method SPIN
Service Interaction time(s) (k,r) time(s) (k,r) time(s)
CW + DO NA (2754.0) (4,3) NA (15311.3) (11,3) 1.5
CW + DT
 
0.8 (2,0) 6595.3 (10,0) 1.4
CW + OCS
 
0.7 (2,0) 3819.6 (10,0) 1.6
CW + TCS
 
0.7 (2,0) 8130.8 (10,0) 1.6
CF + DO NA (1346.5) (4,7) NA (4973.5) (7,4) 1.5
CF + DT
 
0.6 (2,0) 19.6 (6,0) 1.2
CF + OCS
 
0.5 (2,0) 49.9 (6,0) 1.3
CF + TCS
 
0.5 (2,0) 37.7 (6,0) 1.2
DC + DO 6.6 (3,3) NA (4266.9) (8,5) 0.9
DC + DT 0.4 (2,2) 0.7 (2,2) 0.9
DC + OCS
 
0.3 (2,0) 1.3 (3,0) 0.9
DC + TCS
 
0.3 (2,0) 1.3 (3,0) 1.0
DO + DT 1149.4 (4,5) NA (8892.3) (8,4) 0.8
DO + OCS 1023.4 (4,6) NA (6037.8) (7,4) 0.9
DO + TCS 257.1 (3,6) NA (1249.2) (7,4) 0.9
DT + OCS 16.1 (3,5) NA (29077.8) (7,4) 1.0
DT + TCS 14.0 (3,4) NA (13662.3) (8,4) 1.0
OCS + TCS [B]   0.3 (2,0) 1.5 (3,0) 0.9
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Table 3.2: Verification result of nondeterminism
Proposed method McMillan’s method SPIN
Service Interaction time(s) (k,r) time(s) (k,r) time(s)
CW + CF
 
3.9 (2,0) NA (1365.9) (6,2) 2.1
CW + DC NA (12326.5) (4,2) NA (4776.5) (7,1) 1.9
CW + DO NA (6512.2) (5,1) NA (4453.4) (8,1) 1.6
CW + DT
 
3.2 (2,0) 1004.3 (8,0) 1.6
CW + OCS
 
2.0 (2,0) 3049.8 (8,0) 1.8
CW + TCS
 
2.1 (2,0) 3910.2 (8,0) 1.7
CF + DC NA (1033.9) (2,4) NA (7664.3) (7,2) 2.3
CF + DO NA (1346.5) (4,7) NA (8177.8) (8,2) 1.5
CF + DT
 
0.7 (2,0) 31.8 (5,0) 1.3
CF + OCS
 
0.5 (2,0) 39.5 (5,0) 1.3
CF + TCS
 
0.5 (2,0) 53.8 (5,0) 1.3
DC + DO
 
0.3 (2,0) 0.4 (2,0) 1.3
DC + DT 25.7 (3,3) NA (35501.1) (6,4) 0.9
DC + OCS 74.5 (3,4) NA (3749.4) (5,3) 1.2
DC + TCS 45.6 (3,3) NA (3485.2) (4,5) 1.2
DO + DT 4.8 (2,4) NA (7057.7) (3,8) 1.0
DO + OCS 16.3 (2,5) NA (2922.1) (3,7) 0.9
DO + TCS 19.6 (2,5) NA (1700.3) (3,6) 0.9
DT + OCS
 
0.3 (2,0) 0.7 (2,0) 0.9
DT + TCS
 
0.3 (2,0) 0.3 (2,0) 0.9
OCS + TCS
 
0.3 (2,0) 0.5 (2,0) 1.0
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For all the three methods, the execution time needed for verification is pre-
sented. The execution time is the total time that elapsed between when a service
specification was input and when the verification was completed. NA means that
we could not complete verification since an error was caused by memory over-
flow when the program was generating an interpolant. (The number inside the
parentheses shows the elapsed time till the error occurred.)
For the proposed method and McMillan’s method,    shows the value of 
of the finally executed instance of FINITERUN and the number of times of com-
puting an interpolant in that execution of FINITERUN.
For all cases where the verification was completed, our proposed method out-
performed the McMillan’s ordinary unbounded model checking in execution time.
In particular, when a violation required a relatively large number of transitions to
occur, the proposed method could conclude the existence of the violation using a
much smaller value . Such cases include: CW + DT, CW + OCS, CW + TCS, CF
+ DT, CF + OCS, CF + TCS in Table 3.1 and CW + CF, CW + DT, CW + OCS,
CW + TCS, CF + DT, CF + OCS, CF + TCS in Table 3.2. This clearly shows that
when  is fixed, our encoding scheme allows a larger state space to be explored.
SPIN consistently exhibited good performance; but our proposed method out-
performed SPIN for many cases, including: CW + DT, CW + OCS, CW + TCS,
CF + DT, CF + OCS, CF + TCS, DC + DT, DC + OCS, DC + TCS, OCS + TCS in
Table 3.1 and CF + DT, CF + OCS, CF + TCS, DC + DO, DT + OCS, DT + TCS,
OCS + TCS in Table 3.2. When our method showed lower performance or even
aborted, a large  was (or would be) needed for the algorithm to terminate. This
fact is explained by the fact the time needed for generating an interpolant rapidly
increases with the size of the input formula.
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One might think that the result is somewhat discouraging; but we think there
is still plenty of room for improving our method. We will discuss this point in the
final chapter.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a verification method for checking whether or not fea-
ture interaction occurs in telecommunication services. We used a new encoding
scheme that effectively represents the behaviors of asynchronous systems such as
telecommunication systems. Based on this encoding, we developed an unbounded
model checking method. To show the effectiveness of our method, we conducted
experiments. To the best of our knowledge this was the first time to adapt un-
bounded model checking to the interleaving concurrency of asynchronous sys-
tems.
Chapter 4
Feature Interaction Verification in
Home Network Systems
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we propose a method for detecting feature interactions by means
of the SPIN model checker [32, 28]. The main contributions of this chapter are as
follows: First, we propose a method for describing a home network system and its
users in Promela [31, 33]. Our proposed approach focuses only on the high-level
behavior of services, and thus can be used independently of underlying network
protocols, such as [47, 19, 17]. Second, we classify feature interactions based on
their causes. We also devise an LTL formula for each type of feature interaction.
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 introduces a running ex-
ample of a home network system. Section 4.3 presents our proposed method for
detecting feature interactions between services in home network systems. First, a
method for describing home network systems and its users is presented. Then, the
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Light
Thermometer
Air conditioner 
DVD Player
Ventilator
Home Server
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Illuminometer
Smoke
sensor
Curtain
blind
Figure 4.1: An example of home network system
classification of feature interactions and the LTL formula describing each classi-
fied type are presented. Section 4.4 shows the results of an experiment to demon-
strate the usefulness of the proposed approach. Section 4.5 concludes this chapter.
4.2 Preliminaries
4.2.1 Home Network Systems
An example of a home network system is shown in Figure 4.1. The home network
system consists of an air-conditioner, a ventilator, a smoke sensor, two thermome-
ters (inside and outside a room), a DVD player, a TV set, lights, a curtain blind,
an illuminometer and a home server.
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4.2.2 Services in Home Network Systems
By integrating features of different appliances, convenient services can be im-
plemented. These value-added services are one of the main advantages of home
network systems. Below we present such services in our running example. Some
of the services are taken from [27].
HVAC service (Heating): The HVAC service integrates the features of the
air-conditioner, the two thermometers, and the ventilator. This service achieves
energy-efficient air-conditioning of a room. If the room is cooler than the tem-
perature set point, the HVAC service operates the air-conditioner in the heating
mode. To efficiently warm the room up, the HVAC service turns the ventilator on
to provide warmer outside air if the room temperature is cooler than the outside
temperature. In this case the ventilator will be kept operating until the room tem-
perature reaches the outside temperature. If the room temperature is warmer than
the temperature set point, the HVAC service operates the air-conditioner in the fan
mode.
Air-cleaning service: The air-cleaning service uses the smoke sensor and the
ventilator to automatically clean the air in the room. When smoke is detected, this
service automatically turns on the ventilator. The ventilator is kept operating until
the sensor senses no smoke. When the air is cleaned, the ventilator will be turned
off.
Home theater service: The home theater service uses the TV set, the DVD
player, the illuminometer, the lights and the curtain blinds. When activated, this
service turns on the TV set and the DVD player. At the same time, the curtain
blinds in the room are drawn down, and the lights are adjusted to the optimal level
based on the current brightness of the illuminometer.
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Energy saving service: This service aims to conserve energy consumption by
turning off unnecessary appliances. For example, when the power of the TV set is
off, it is useless to keep the power of the DVD player turned on. This service will
turn off the DVD player in such a situation.
4.2.3 Feature Interactions of Services
In this section, we show several examples of interactions between the services
shown in Section 4.2.2.
Example 5 A feature interaction occurs between the HVAC service and the air-
cleaning service. Consider the following situation: The room temperature is 15 C˚,
the outside temperature is 8 C˚, and there is smoke in the room. The temperature
set point of the HVAC service is 21 C˚. Now suppose that the HVAC service is
operating the air-conditioner in the heating mode. In this case, the HVAC service
tries to turn off the ventilator to prevent cool outside air from flowing into the
room. On the other hand, the air-cleaning service tries to turn on the ventilator to
clean the room air.
Example 6 This interaction occurs between the home theater service and the en-
ergy saving service. Consider the following scenario: The power of the TV set is
OFF at the beginning. The energy saving service checks the power of the TV set.
The service comes to know that the TV set is OFF and thus tries to turn off the
DVD player. At the same time, the home theater service is activated and turns on
the TV set. As a result, the DVD player is turned off, while the TV set is turned
on.
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Example 7 Suppose that the HVAC service is operating the air-conditioner in the
heating mode to warm up the room temperature and that the air-cleaning service
is using the ventilator to clean the room air. If the room temperature is higher than
the outside temperature, cool outside air is taken by the ventilator. This lowers the
efficiency of the HVAC service.
4.3 Detection of Feature Interactions with SPIN
To use SPIN, the system to be verified needs to be described in the Promela lan-
guage and properties to be verified are represented as LTL formulas. In Section
4.3.1, we show a method for describing home network systems and its users. Next,
in Section 4.3.2, we show a classification of feature interactions based on their
causes. We also devise LTL formulas to detect these feature interactions.
4.3.1 Describing Home Network Systems and Users in Promela
This section shows a method for describing home network systems and its users
in Promela. A home network system is modeled as three components: the envi-
ronment, appliances and services. The environment consists of several elements,
such as the room temperature and smoke. The state of these elements is changed
by the effects from appliances. The appliances are operated by services. Users
execute these services.
Figure 4.2 shows a model of home network systems and its users. In Figure
4.2, there are two users, two services (the HVAC service and the air-cleaning
service), three appliances (an air-conditioner, a ventilator and a smoke sensor),
and three elements of the environment (room temperature, smoke, and brightness).
4.3. DETECTION OF FEATURE INTERACTIONS WITH SPIN 43
UserA UserB
HVAC service Air-cleaning service
Air-conditioner Ventilator Smoke Sensor
Temperature Smoke
Brightness
user
service
appliance
environment
Home Appliance Network
Figure 4.2: System model for home network systems
In this figure, the arrows represent relations between the four components. UserA
executes the HVAC service. The HVAC service operates the air-conditioner and
the ventilator. The air-conditioner has an effect on the room temperature, and the
ventilator has effects on the room temperature and the smoke.
In this section, we present a method for describing these four components: the
environment, appliances, services and users.
In Promela programs, the states of these components are represented by vari-
ables. The types of these variables are defined, for example, as follows:
#define tTemp int
#define tPower int /* ON or OFF */
#define OFF 0
#define ON 1
tTemp is the type of the variables that represent temperatures. tPower is the
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type of the variables that represent the power of appliances. Variables of tPower
type can take OFF or ON, which is internally represented as an integer 0 or 1.
The Environment
The elements of the environment are defined as global variables. A room tempera-
ture temp_in and an outside temperature temp_out can be defined as follows:
tTemp temp_in; tTemp temp_out;
To model an unpredictable environment we let these variables take arbitrary
values when they are read by appliances. For example, the room temperature
changes even when the air-conditioner is not working. This modeling technique
can be found in, for example, [11]?
We represent the effects of the appliances on the environment by Boolean-
valued formulas over the variables that represent the state of appliances and the
state of the environment. As shown later, these formulas allow us to detect con-
flicting effects. For example, the effect temp_in_up, which indicates the pres-
ence of some appliance that is warming the room up, is defined as follows:
#define temp_in_up
((AC_power == ON && AC_Mode == Heater)
||(ventilator_power == ON && temp_in < temp_out))
Here AC_power, AC_mode and ventilator_power respectively represent
the power of the air-conditioner, the mode of the air-conditioner, and the power of
the ventilator. This Boolean formula evaluates to true when the air-conditioner is
working in the heating mode or when the outside temperature is warmer than the
room and the ventilator is working.
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Appliances
Appliances are described with variables and macros. The variables represent the
state of the appliances. The macros represent the methods of the appliances, such
as setting the power to ON and setting the mode to a particular mode.
The state of the appliance is defined as global variables as was done with
the environment. For example, the variables power, AC_temp and AC_Mode,
which represent the power, the temperature set point and the mode of the air con-
ditioner, are defined as follows:
tPower AC_power=OFF; tTemp AC_Temp=25;
tMode AC_Mode=FAN;
The methods of the appliances are invoked by services. The methods can have
arguments. The behavior of each method consists of reading the variables of the
environment, writing/reading the variables of its own appliance and returning a
value to the caller service.
Each method has a pre-condition and a post-condition. The method can be
executed when the pre-condition is true. The post-condition need to become true
immediately after the method is executed.
Each method is defined as a macro of Promela, as shown in Figure 4.3.
pre condition, post condition are Boolean expressions which rep-
resent a pre-condition and a post-condition respectively. In Promela, if a Boolean
expression is used as a statement, it blocks system execution until the Boolean
expression evaluates to true. Hence, when the pre-condition is true, the method
executes the statements described at line 3. If the post-condition is also true, then
return_value will be sent back to the caller service.
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1 #define Appliance_method(argument){\
2 (pre_condition);\
3 ... /* The beavior of the method */
4 (post_condition);\
5 rvalue = return_value;}
Figure 4.3: Description of a method of an appliance
Services
Each service is modeled by two Promela processes, one of which represents the
behavior of the service and the other of which represents the communication be-
tween the service and users.
The process representing the behavior controls appliances by executing their
methods. A method invocation is performed by executing the macro correspond-
ing to the method. Special local variable r_value is used to store the return
value from a method.
Figure 4.4 shows the Promela code of the process that describes the behavior
of the HVAC service. At lines 2, 3, local variables are defined. At lines 4 – 13,
the behavior of the HVAC service is described. At line 4, this service waits until
the variable HVAC_State is set to START. Line 5 is a do-statement which is an
iteration statement of Promela. At lines 6 – 10, several macros are executed.
The state of a service is represented by a set of global variables. The process
that deals with communication updates the state in response to the reception of a
message from a user. Figure 4.5 shows the process for the HVAC service.
For each Service, global variable Service_State is declared to con-
trol the start and the stop of the service. This variable takes two values: STOP?
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1 proctype HVAC(){
2 int rvalue;
3 tTemp Ti_temp,To_temp; /* Local variables*/
4 (HVAC_state == START);
5 do ::!(HVAC_state == STOP)->
6 Thermometer_in_SetPower(ON);
7 Thermometer_out_SetPower(ON);
8 AC_SetPower(ON);
9 Thermometer_in_Measure(); Ti_temp = r_value;
10 Thermometer_out_Measure(); To_temp = r_value;
11 do ::(Ti_temp < user_temp)->
12 AC_SetMode(HEATER);
13 :
14 }
Figure 4.4: The behavior part of the HVAC service
START. The service waits until a user sets this variable to START. When this
variable is set to START, the service performs its execution. When the variable
is set to STOP by a user, the service stops and waits until a user sets this variable
to START again. In addition to Service_State other global variables may be
used. For example, the HVAC service has variable HVAC_SetTemp to represent
the temperature set point.
For each such global variable, a message channel is declared. MC_HVAC_
State and MC_HVAC_SetTemp are the message channels for HVAC_State
and HVAC_SetTemp. To set the variable to a particular value, users send a mes-
sage in the message channel. For example, MC_HVAC_state?HVAC_state
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1 proctype HVAC_cont(){
2 do
3 ::MC_HVAC_State?HVAC_State
4 ::MC_HVAC_SetTemp?HVAC_SetTemp
5 od;
6 }
Figure 4.5: The communication part of the HVAC Service
takes a message in the message channe MC_HVAC_State and stores it in vari-
able HVAC_State.
Users
Users control services by sending messages to message channels. For example,
in the case of the HVAC service, a user may send the value of the temperature set
point, as well as a signal for start and stop, as shown in Figure 4.6. In this figure,
UserA sets the variable SetTemp, a temperature set point, to 21 C˚ and sets the
variable HVAC_State to START. After the HVAC service starts, the user sets
HVAC_State to STOP to stop the HVAC service.
1 proctype UserA(){
2 MC_HVAC_SetTemp!21;
3 MC_HVAC_State!START;
4 MC_HVAC_State!STOP;
5 }
Figure 4.6: The execution of HVAC service by user A
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Figure 4.7: Feature interactions in home network systems
4.3.2 Representing Correctness Claims as LTL Formulas
In this section, we classify feature interactions based on their causes. To detect
feature interactions using SPIN, we need to represent the absence of each type of
feature interactions as an LTL formula. Two kinds of temporal operators are used
in this chapter: always and eventually. The operator “always” is represented as
[]. A formula [] P evaluates to true if P is always true in all system executions.
The operator “eventually” is represented as <>. A formula <> P evaluates to true
if P eventually becomes true in all system executions.
In general, feature interaction occurs when conflicting accesses are attempted
to the same resource. Since there are four types of components (i.e., users, ser-
vices, appliances and the environment), we have a simple classification as follows:
Interaction with services: Two users send conflicting commands to the same
service.
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Interaction with appliances: Two services are attempting conflicting operations
on the same appliance.
Interaction with the environment: Two appliances have conflicting effects on
the same element of the environment.
Figure 4.7 shows the examples of these interactions. In this figure, UserA
and UserB can send conflicting commands to the HVAC service. The HVAC
service and the air-cleaning service can operate the ventilator with conflicting
purposes. The air-conditioner and the ventilator have conflicting effects on the
room temperature.
Interactions with Services
Interactions occur with services when two users send conflicting commands to the
same service. This type of interaction can be detected by checking if an incoming
message conflicts with the previous message.
We consider a message  from a user to a service to be conflicting if the fol-
lowing three conditions are met: the service has already received another message

;  was issued by a different user; and the command of  is different from
that of .
To detect conflicting messages, we modify send/receive statements of user and
service processes in two respects. First, the identity of sender users is attached to
every message. Second, additional Promela code is inserted immediately after
each receive statement of a service. For example, the receive statement of line 3
in Figure 4.5 will be modified as follows:
MC_HVAC_State?user,HVAC_State;
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if
::(MC_HVAC_State?[_,_] &&
!MC_HVAC_State?[eval(user),_] &&
!MC_HVAC_State?[_,eval(HVAC_State)])
-> HVAC_error = 1;
::else -> skip;
fi;
MC?[a1,a2] evaluates to true iff in channel MC a message (a1,a2) exists. Un-
derscore (_) is used as a wildcard. eval() is a function that returns the current
value of the variable given as an argument.
The variable HVAC_error is used to record the occurrence of interactions.
We let each Service have variable Service_error. If there is a conflict-
ing message in the message channel, Service_error is set to 1. As a result
interactions with each Service can be detected by checking the following LTL
formula:
!<> (Service_error == 1)
Interactions with Appliances
Application-level interactions occur when several services try to execute conflict-
ing operations on the same appliance. This type of interaction occurs in two sit-
uations: A1) two services try to change the state of the appliance to different
states and A2) one service reads the state of an appliance when another service is
changing the state.
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We define variable appliance_error for each appliance to represent wheth-
er or not a feature interaction has occurred (0: not occurred, 1: A1, 2: A2).
appliance_error is updated when a feature interaction occurred.
Detection of A1: Interaction A1 occurs when two services try to set the same
variable of an appliance to different values. To detect this interaction, we can use
a similar way as interaction S1. We translate a variable assignment statement into
a pair of a send statement and a receive statement, mimicking value assignment
as message passing. When the send statement is executed, interaction A1 can
be detected by checking whether or not a conflicting message has already been
sent. For example, Figure 4.8 shows method AC_SetMode(mode) of the air-
conditioner.
1 #define AC_SetMode(mode){\
2 AC_Power == ON;\
3 if\
4 ::(MC_AC_Mode?[_] && !(MC_AC_Mode?[mode]))\
5 -> AC_error = 1;\
6 ::else -> skip;\
7 fi;\
8 MC_AC_Mode!mode;\
9 MC_AC_Mode?AC_Mode;}
Figure 4.8: Method SetMode of the air-conditioner
In Promela, if a message channel is full, the send statement waits until the
message channel becomes non-full. For a method to receive the message sent by
itself, the buffer size of message channel must be 1. This guarantees that, for
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example, when the receive statement is executed at line 9 in Figure 4.8, the only
message in the message channel is the message sent at line 8. Hence, the message
that can be received at line 9 is only the message sent at line 8.
Detection of A2: Interaction A2 occurs in the situation where one service tries
to read a variable when another service is changing the value of the variable.
As a result of this interaction, the value obtained by the former service becomes
different from the actual value of the variable. This interaction can be detected
by checking, whenever a method reads a variable, if the channel associated with
that variable contains a new value different from the current one. For example,
the macro TV_CheckPower, which is used to check the power of the TV set by
services, is described as follows:
#define TV_CheckPower(){\
true;\
if\
::(MC_TV_Power?[_] && \
!(MC_TV_Power?[eval(TV_Power)]))\
-> TV_error = 2;\
::else -> skip;\
fi;\
r_value = TV_Power;}
For each appliance, interactions on it can be detected by checking if the value
of Appliance_error is 1 or 2. If checking interaction A1, for example, one
can use the following LTL formula:
!<> AC_error == 1
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Interactions with the Environment
Interactions with the environment occur when two appliances have conflicting
effects on the same element of the environment. Hence this interaction occurs in
the following two situations: E1) there are two different kinds of effects occurring
on the same element of the environment simultaneously, and E2) some appliance
reads the state of an environment element while some effect on that element is
existing.
Detection of E1: This interaction can be detected by checking that continuous
conflicting effects on the same environment element never occurs. This property
is represented by an LTL formula as follows:
LTL:!<> [](e_eff1 && e_eff2)
where e_eff is the formula that represents that some appliance has an effect
eff on the element e. This LTL formula asserts that the two different effects on
the same element never occurs simultaneously. When the number of the types of
effects is more than 2, by checking all pairs of effects, one can detect this type of
interactions. For example, when the number of types is 3, the LTL formula can be
described as follows:
LTL:!<>( [](e_eff1 && e_eff2) || [](e_eff1 && e_eff3)
|| [](e_eff2 && e_eff3) )
Detection of E2: This interaction can be detected by checking if some effect is
existing on an element of the environment when a service reads the state of the
same environment element. For each environment element e, variable e_read
is used to detect such a situation. We add the following statements to all methods
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that read the value of the element e at the point just before a statement that reads
the value of the element.
e_read = 1; e_read = 0;
The value of e_read becomes 1 only if some method has just read the state
of e. As a result this type of interaction can be detected by using the following
LTL formula:
LTL:!<> (e_read && (e_eff1 || .. || e_effn))
(e_eff1 || .. || e_effn) represents that no effect is occurring on
e. Hence, this LTL formula asserts that effects on the environment element e
never exist while the state of e is being read.
4.4 Experiment
We conducted an experiment, in which we attempted to detect interactions caused
by any pair of the four services of our running example (see Section 4.2.2). In this
experiment, we assumed that there are two users and each user executes a single
service. The experiment was conducted on a WindowsXP PC with a 900MHz
PentiumIII and 512MB memory. SPIN was used with partial order reduction en-
abled.
In our running example, there are ten appliances as shown in Figure 4.1. Each
appliance has one or two variables and two to six methods. The lines of code of
the HVAC service, of the air-cleaning service and of the home theater service are
all approximately 50 lines. The energy saving service is described in around ten
lines.
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Detection of service-level interactions was conducted by enforcing the two
users to run the same service. Unlike the other three services, the HVAC service
requires the user to specify the temperature set point. In this experiment, this value
is set to 21 C˚ or 25 C˚.
For each of the two interaction types, A1 and A2, we check whether or not the
interaction occurs for the ten appliances. Hence, we run a verification 20 times
for each pair of services.
To detect interactions with the environment, we run a verification eight times,
because there are two types, E1 and E2, of interactions and four environment
elements.
4.4.1 Verification Results
The verification results are summarized in Table 4.1: This table shows the inter-
actions detected between two services. S1, A1, A2, E1 and E2 indicate the type of
interactions (services (S1), appliances (A1, A2), the environment (E1, E2)). Each
symbol is followed by the component with which the interaction occurs. For ex-
ample, when one user executes the HVAC service and the other user executes the
air-cleaning service, a type A1 interaction with ventilator can occur. In the same
case, type E1 and type E2 interactions with the room temperature and a type E2
interaction with smoke can occur.
Some performance figures are shown in Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for the pair
of the HVAV service and the air-cleaning service. Table 4.2 shows the results for
interactions with appliances, while Table 4.3 shows those for interactions with the
environment. These tables show the verification results (true indicates that an
interaction was found), the execution time, and the number of states explored for
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Table 4.2: Interaction with appliances between the HVAC service and the air-
cleaning service
appliance type result time(s) state
Air-conditioner A1 true 
    	
A2 true 
    	
Thermometer A1 true     	
(inside) A2 true 
    	
Thermometer A1 true 

    	
(outside) A2 true     	
smoke sensor A1 true 
    	
A2 true 
    	
ventilator A1 false 
    
A2 true     	
each appliance or environment element. The results for the appliances that are not
used by the two services are omitted. As shown in these tables, the time required
for verification is fairly reasonable.
Using counterexamples provided by SPIN, we detected scenarios leading to
interactions. Below we show several examples of such scenarios.
Type A1 interaction with the ventilator between the HVAC service and the
air-cleaning service: The room temperature is warmer than the outside temper-
ature, and there is smoke in the room. The HVAC service and the air-cleaning
service are both running. The HVAC service calls method SetPower(OFF) of
the ventilator to turn it off, to prevent cool outside air from flowing into the room.
On the other hand, the air-cleaning service executes method SetPower(ON)
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Table 4.3: Interaction with the environment between the HVAC service and the
air-cleaning service
element type result time(s) state
room E1 false 
    
temperature E2 false      
outside E1 true     	
temperature E2 true 
    	
smoke E1 true 
    	
E2 false 
     
brightness E1 true     	
E2 true     	
of the ventilator to turn it on to clean the room air. As a result, the conflicting
operations of the ventilator are executed at the same time.
Type E1 interaction with the room temperature between the HVAC service
and the air-cleaning service: This scenario is the same as the third example in
Section 4.2.3.
Type E2 interaction with the room temperature between the HVAC service
and the air-cleaning service: Suppose that the room temperature is cooler than
the outside temperature and that the air-cleaning service is operating the ventilator
to clean the room air. In this situation, the ventilator warms the room up. Now the
HVAC service executes the method that measures the current room temperature.
Since the ventilator is having an effect on the room temperature, the HVAC service
can erroneously recognize the room temperature as if it were lower than the actual
value, resulting in execution of unnecessary heating.
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Type A1 interaction with the DVD player between the home theater service
and the energy saving service: The power of the TV set is OFF at the beginning.
The energy saving service checks the power of the TV set. The service comes to
know that the TV set is OFF and thus tries to execute SetPower(OFF) to turn
off the DVD player. At this time, the home theater service is activated and tries to
execute SetPower(ON) to turn the DVD player on. As a result, the conflicting
operations to DVD player are executed.
Interaction A2 with the TV set between the home theater service and the
energy saving service: This scenario is the same as the second example in Section
4.2.3.
4.4.2 Discussion
Unlike telecommunication systems, modeling home network systems requires us
to consider the “physical” environment which might involve, for example, tem-
perature or brightness. A method for detecting feature interactions in a telecom-
munication system by using the SPIN model checker is proposed in [9], but it
can not be applied to home network systems. In the context of interaction de-
tection for intelligent building control systems, Metzger and Webel proposed an
approach to deal with such physical elements of the environment [37]. The idea
of their approach is to detect different services that access the same environment
element. Unlike ours, their approach does not consider how the services affect the
environment. As a result it easily yields false negatives.
In our proposed framework, we define the types of effects on the environ-
ment to overcome this problem. For example, consider the situation where both
the HVAC service and the air-cleaning service operate a ventilator. Because the
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ventilator has effect on the “Smoke” element of the environment these two ser-
vices access the same element of the environment. Existing methods such as [37]
consider these situations as feature interactions. However, this situation is not un-
desirable because the purpose of each service is not interfered. In our proposed
framework, these situations were correctly considered desirable. This can be seen
in the experiment in Section 4.4. The verification result shows that type E1 inter-
action with smoke between the HVAC service and the air-cleaning service does
not occur.
Research that addressed the feature interaction problem of home network sys-
tems includes [27, 39]. In [27], a runtime detection method and a priority-based
resolution are proposed. Our approach works at a higher abstract level than [27]
in the sense that interactions detected by our approach might be resolved by pri-
oritizing services. Thus, even when such a runtime resolution exists, the results
obtained through our approach can be used to identify the situations where the
mechanism comes into play, resulting in a better understanding of the system be-
havior.
In [39], a static method for detecting feature interactions is proposed. How-
ever, this method is a conservative approximation method and thus can detect false
feature interactions which will never occur in actual runs.
The authors of [29] propose a method for verifying the behavior of services
with the SMV model checker [35]. This method can also be used for feature inter-
action detection, it was not the main objective of [29], though. The work presented
in this chapter improves [29] in several ways: First, we classified interactions and
devised the LTL correctness claim for each category. These LTL formulas allow
systematic interaction detection, while in [29] correctness claims were constructed
62 CHAPTER 4. FEATURE INTERACTION VERIFICATION IN HOME NETWORK SYSTEMS
in an ad hoc manner. Another improvement came from our adopting the Promela
language. Unlike the SMV input language, Promela is similar to conventional
procedural programming languages. This makes it much easier to describe the
specification of appliances and services.
Our proposed framework focuses only on the high-level behavior of services,
and thus can be used independently of underlying network protocols. For exam-
ple, we show a way of applying our framework to ECHONET specifications.
Appliances are represented as objects which consist of state variables in ECHO-
NET. Appliances are operated by writing/reading the variables. The variables in
ECHONET specifications can be directly represented as those in our model. Writ-
ing/reading operations on the variables in ECHONET specifications can be trans-
lated into methods in our model. Because the effects on the environment are not
defined in ECHONET specifications, we must define the effects on the environ-
ment for each state of appliances. As a result, applying our proposed framework
to ECHONET specifications proceeds as follows: First, state variables of appli-
ances of ECHONET specifications are translated into variables and methods of
appliances in our model. Second the effects on the environment are defined for
appliances. Finally, the services are described in the format of our model.
As a case study, we describe a ventilator and a service which achieves low
power consumption of houses in the ECHONET standard available from [17] us-
ing our proposed model. This is shown in the appendix of this chapter.
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4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a method for detecting feature interactions in home
network systems. The proposed method uses SPIN, an LTL model checker. We
classified interactions into several types and devised LTL formulas that repre-
sent the absence of these interactions. To demonstrate the usefulness of the pro-
posed approach, we conducted an experiment. We checked whether or not feature
interactions occur in our running example and successfully detected several in-
teractions. By using counterexamples produced by SPIN, we also succeeded in
obtaining scenarios leading to the interactions.
4.6 Appendix
Description of Ventilator
We show that the specification of a ventilator described in the ECHONET standard
can be represented using our proposed model.
The ventilator has eight variables: OperationStatus, RoomRelative-
Humid, VentilatingStatus,MeasureHumid, VentilatingWindLev-
el, HeatExchangerStatus, CO2Concentration, and SmokeDetec-
tionStatus.
Six variables, OperationStatus, RoomRelativeHumid, Ventilat-
ingStatus, VentilatingWindLevel, HeatExchangerStatus, and
CO2Concentration, and two operations, Get, by which the variable is read,
and Set, by which the variable is written, are defined. Two variables, Measure-
Humid and SmokeDetectionStatus: have only one operation Get. To rep-
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resent these operations as methods, we define the pre-condition and the post-
condition of each method as follows: The pre-conditions for all methods are true.
The post-condition of Set is defined such that it becomes true if the value of the
variable has been correctly updated. The post-condition of Get is defined as true.
Here we only show the pre-conditions and the post-conditions for Set and Get of
OperationStatus, because these for the other variables are identical except
the name of the variable.
Since the effects on the environment are not defined in ECHONET, we define
three types of effects on the environment. When the state of the ventilator is ON,
the smoke is removed. When the state of the ventilator is ON and the room tem-
perature is warmer than the outside, the effect “down” on the element “temp in”
of the environment occurs. On the other hand, when the state of the ventilator is
ON and the room temperature is cooler than the outside, the effect “up” on the
element “temp in” of the environment occurs.
 Ventilation = (F

, M

, EW

). F

is a set of variables, M

is a set of meth-
ods, and EW

(eff) is a formula which represents the state of the ventilator
and the state of the environment when the ventilator has an effect on the
element "" of the environment.
 F

= (OperationStatus, RoomRelativeHumid, VentilatingStatus, Measured-
Humid, VentilatingWindLevel, HeatExchangerStatus, CO2Concentration,
SmokeDetectionStatus)
 M

= (Get OperationStatus(), Set OperationStatus(status), Get RoomRe-
lativeHumid(), Set RoomRelativeHumid(humid), Get VentilatingStatus(),
Set VentilatingStatus(status), Get MeasuredHumid(), Get VentilatingWind-
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Level(), Set VentilatingWindLevel(level), Get HeatExchangerStatus(), Set-
HeatExchangerStatus(status), Get CO2Concentration(), Set CO2Concent-
ration(concentration), Get SmokeDetectionStatus(status))
– Pre(Get OperationStatus()) = [true]
– Post(Get OperationStatus()) = [true]
– Pre(Set OperationStatus(status)) = [true]
– Post(Set OperationStatus(status)) = [OperationStatus =status]
 EW

(eff):
eff=Smoke removal: [ OperationStatus = ON]
eff=Temp in up: [ OperationStatus = ON  Temp in&Temp out]
eff=Temp in down: [ OperationStatus = ON  Temp in % Temp out]
otherwise: [false]
The Promela description can be obtained by translating the above description.
We show the Get and Set methods for OperationStatus.
/* Definition of types */
#define tStatus int
#define OFF 0
#define ON 1
#define tAuto
#define Auto 2
#define NonAuto 3
#define tSmoke int
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#define Found 4
#Define NotFound 5
/* Definition of Variable */
tStatus Ventilation_OperationStatus;
int Ventilation_RoomRelativeHumid;
tAuto Ventilation_VentilatingStatus;
int Ventilation_MeasuredHumid;
int Ventilation_VentilatingWindLevel;
tStatus Ventilation_HeatExchangerStatus;
int Ventilation_CO2Concentration;
tSmoke Ventilation_SmokeDetectionStatus;
/* variable for detecting interaction */
int Ventilation_error=0;
/* Operations for OperationStatus */
#define Ventilation_Get_OperationStatus(){\
true;\
if::(MC_Ventilation_OperationStatus?[_] &&
!(MC_Ventilation_OperationStatus?
[eval(Ventilation_operationStatus)]))\
-> Ventilation_error = 2;\
::else-> skip;fi;\
r_value = Ventilation_OperationStatus;
}
#define Ventilation_Set_OperationStatus(status){\
true\
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if::(MC_Ventilation_OperationStatus?[_] &&
!(MC_Ventilation_OperationStatus?[mode]))\
->Ventilation_error = 1;\
::else -> skip; fi;
MC_Ventilation_OperationStatus!status;\
MC_Ventilation_OperationStatus?Ventilation_OperationStatus;\
}
Description of the Energy Management Service
Here, EMS (Energy Management Service) in ECHONET is described in Promela.
This service checks the total power consumption of all appliances, and if the
power consumption exceeds a certain value ( ) set by users, the service suspends
the appliances based on the priority until the power consumption becomes lower
than the value of  . If the power consumption is lower than the value   and
there are appliances suspended by the service, the service restarts the appliances.
To use this service, users need to set the values of   and  . The behavior of this
service is as follows:
1. This service checks the power consumption of all appliances. If the total
power consumption exceeds  , step 2 is executed. If the power consump-
tion is lower than  , the next step is step 3. Otherwise, it repeats step 1.
2. This service suspends the appliance that has the lowest priority, and returns
to step 1. If there are no appliances that can be suspended, this service gives
the alarm and terminates.
3. If there are suspended appliances, this service restarts one of the appliances.
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After that, this service returns to step 1.
As in the document of the ECHONET standard, we consider a home network
system which consists of an air-conditioner, a ventilator, a freezer, a microwave,
a heater, and a washer. In this case, EMS can be described as follows. We assume
that the priorities and the power consumption of all appliances are given. About
one hundred lines of Promela code for the EMS service is obtained.
int EMS_State;
int priority[6]; /* priority for each appliance*/
int consumption[6];/* power consumption*/
SERVICE EMS(int Is, int Ie){
VAR
int It;
bool cut[6]; # suspended appliance
# suspended: 1
int maxpriority, minpriority;
#max: appliance: not suspended and max priority
#min: appliance: suspended and min priority
tStatus Status_tmp;
CONTENT
# initialize for cut
cut[0]=0;cut[1]=0;cut[2]=0;
cut[3]=0;cut[4]=0;cut[5]=0;
while(EMS_STATE=START){
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#maxpriority, minpriority
It = 0; maxpriority = 0; minpriority = 255;
#power consumption of air-conditioner
Status_tmp :=
Air_conditioner.Get_OperationStatus();
if(Status_tmp == ON){
It := It + consumption[0];
if(cut[0] = 0 && priority[0] < minpriority){
minpriority := priority[0];}}
if(cut[0] = 1 && priority[0] > maxpriority){
maxpriority := priority[0];}
#power consumption of ventilator
Status_tmp := Ventilater.Get_OperationStatus();
if(Status_tmp = ON){
It := It + consumption[1];
if(cut[1] = 0 && priority[1] < minpriority){
minpriority := priority[1];}}
if(cut[1] = 1 && priority[1] > maxpriority){
maxpriority := priority[1];}
#power consumption of freezer
Status_tmp := Freezer.Get_OperationStatus();
if(Status_tmp = ON){
It := It + consumption[2];
if(cut[2] = 0 && priority[2] < minpriority){
minpriority := priority[2];}}
if(cut[2] = 1 && priority[2] > maxpriority){
maxpriority = priority[2];}
70 CHAPTER 4. FEATURE INTERACTION VERIFICATION IN HOME NETWORK SYSTEMS
#power consumption of microwave
Status_tmp := Microwave.Get_OperationStatus();
if(Status_tmp = ON){
It := It + consumption[3];
if(cut[3] = 0 && priority[3] < minpriority){
minpriority := priority[3]; }}
if(cut[3] = 1 && priority[3] > maxpriority){
maxpriority = priority[3];}
#power consumption of heater
Status_tmp := Heater.Get_OperationStatus();
if(Status_tmp = ON){
It := It + consumption[4];
if(cut[4] = 0 && priority[4] < minpriority){
minpriority := priority[4];}}
if(cut[4] = 1 && priority[4] > maxpriority){
maxpriority := priority[4];}
#power consumption of washer
Status_tmp := Washer.Get_OperationStatus();
if(Status_tmp = ON){
It := It + consumption[5];
if(cut[5] = 0 && priority[5] < minpriority){
minpriority := priority[5];}}
if(cut[5] = 1 && priority[5] > maxpriority){
maxpriority := priority[5];}
if(It>Is){/* suspend appliances */
if(minpriority = priority[0]){
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Air_conditioner.Set_OperationStatus(OFF);
cut[0] := 1;}
else if(minpriority = priority[1]){
Ventilater.Set_OperationStatus(OFF);
cut[1] := 1;}
else if(minpriority = priority[2]){
Freezer.Set_OperationStatus(OFF);
cut[2] := 1;}
else if(minpriority = priority[3]){
Microwave.Set_OperationStatus(OFF);
cut[3] := 1;}
else if(minpriority = priority[4]){
Heater.Set_OperationStatus(OFF);
cut[4] := 1;}
else if(minpriority = priority[5]){
Washer.Set_OperationStatus(OFF);
cut[5] := 1;}
else {Alarm.Set_OperationStatus(ON);}}
::(It<Ie) -> /* restart appliances*/
if(maxpriority = priority[0]){
Air_conditioner.Set_OperationStatus(ON);
cut[0] := 0;}
else if(maxpriority = priority[1]){
Ventilater.Set_OperationStatus(ON);
cut[1] := 0;}
else if(maxpriority = priority[2]){
Freezer.Set_OperationStatus(ON);
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cut[2] := 0;}
else if(maxpriority = priority[3]){
Microwave.Set_OperationStatus(ON);
cut[3] := 0;}
else if(maxpriority = priority[4]){
Heater.Set_OperationStatus(ON);
cut[4] := 0;}
else if(maxpriority = priority[5]){
Washer.Set_OperationStatus(ON);
cut[5] := 0;}
}
}
Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Achievements
In this dissertation, methods for verifying feature interactions in telecommunica-
tion systems and home network systems were described.
The first achievement is the development of a verification method for veri-
fying feature interactions in telecommunication services with unbounded model
checking. First, a new encoding scheme that effectively represents the behav-
iors of telecommunication systems was proposed. Next, a method for adapting
unbounded model checking to this encoding was described.
To show the effectiveness of our method, we conducted experiments where 21
pairs of telecommunication services were verified using several methods including
ours. The results showed that our approach exhibited significant speed-up over
unbounded model checking using the traditional encoding. Our method exhibited
better or comparable performance comparing to the SPIN model checker in many
cases. In some cases, however, our method could not complete verification, while
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SPIN solved the verification problem in a few seconds.
The second achievement is the development of a framework for detecting fea-
ture interactions in home network systems. Our proposed approach for verifica-
tion of feature interactions consists of two part. First, a model for home network
system is proposed, and the feature interactions in home network systems is clas-
sified based on their causes. Next, an automatic translation method from proposed
model into Promela, which is the input language of the SPIN model checker is pro-
posed. we also proposed LTL formulas which represent the absence of each type
of feature interactions. By using our proposed framework, one can automatically
detect feature interactions in home network systems.
To demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed approach, we conducted an ex-
periment. We checked whether or not feature interactions occur in our running
example and successfully detected several interactions. By using counterexam-
ples produced by SPIN, we also succeeded in obtaining scenarios leading to the
interactions.
5.2 Future Research
Some issues are left for future research. In the research on telecommunication
systems, our implementation is still in its prototype stage. Our current imple-
mentation uses FOCI for interpolant generation. FOCI supports not only pure
propositional logic but also uninterpreted functions or linear arithmetic. By de-
veloping a new, faster interpolation procedure tailored to propositional logic, we
may be able to enhance the performance of our method. This expectation can also
be justified by the facts that the research on interpolation is still in its early stage,
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and that the performance of SAT solving has been improved by several orders of
magnitude in this decade.
In the research on home network systems, a tool should be developed in order
to support users to describe and validate home network services based on the
proposed framework. In this dissertation we show how users can verify home
network services; but doing this requires them to have some knowledge about the
framework. Such a tool would greatly facilitate ordinary users to use the automatic
verification method.
The issue of resolving the detected feature interactions in home network sys-
tems still remains. Many approaches for resolving feature interactions exist. For
example, when feature interaction occurs, the system may ask the users to deter-
mine which service execution is suspended, or the users may assign priorities to
services to automatically abort a service with a lower priority. Finding the best
resolution method for each type of feature interactions is needed.
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